The Selection of Interests, Essay in VocationalPsychology.com

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The Selection of Interests
by Andrew D. Carson, Ph.D.

As Trice, Hughes, Odom, Woods, and McClellan (1995) have aptly observed, "the origins of career aspirations are elusive" (p. 307), and psychologists have sought for the origins of interests in both the environment and genes. Most investigators and theorists have focused their attentions on the role of the environment (e.g., Berdie, 1944; Darley, 1941), either through the role of parenting (e.g., Roe, 1957; Roe and Siegelman, 1964) and other social learning experiences (see Barak, 1981; Osipow, 1983, pp. 143-147). On the other side of the nature/nurture coin, evidence that interests have at least a modest genetic component has accumulated steadily throughout this century (Carter, 1932; Loehlin & Nichols, 1976; Nichols, 1978; Roberts & Johansson, 1974; Vandenberg & Kelly, 1964, cited in Betsworth et al., 1994, p. 264; Vandenberg & Stafford, 1967; see Super, 1949, p. 405). Much of the evidence was equivocal on the gene/environment controversy, even if intriguing; for example, Strong (1957) showed relatively high correlations between measured interests of fathers and sons. At any rate, the evidence for the impact of genes on interests was not so compellingly demonstrated that it was impossible to ignore, and ignored (or at least glossed over) it was.

However, hard evidence that genes play a substantial role in the development of interests seems to be piling up faster than it can be ignored. Betsworth et al. (1994) and others (e.g., Plomin, Corley, DeFries, & Fulker, 1990) have proposed that genes may to a large degree drive the development of interests and preferences. Combining the results of several studies across almost four decades, and using as respondents a variety of sets of respondents differing in degree of kinship and living conditions (e.g., non-twin siblings, monozygotic [MZG] and dizygotic [DZG] twins, twins reared apart or together, adopted unrelated siblings, parents and children), Betsworth et al. (also, Bouchard, 1995) present compelling evidence that genes directly contribute a large proportion of the variance in observed adult interests. Although their methods have not gone without criticism (see, for example, Nelkin and Lindee, 1995, p. 10; also, McGuire & Haviland, 1985), the sheer consistency of the results of the studies reported by Betsworth et al. -- despite the variety of types of samples used (e.g., adoptive, twins) -- suggests that interests do indeed have a strong genetic component. While Betsworth et al. interpret several possible levels of heritability of interests across different portions of their dataset, they conclude that heritability estimates for the reared together twin data suggest that at least 50% of the observed variance of responses to interest inventories is associated with genetic factors (p. 275; Lykken, Bouchard, McGue, and Tellegen, 1993), on par with what many theorists consider to be the level of genetic contribution to both aptitudes and personality traits. They also conclude that approximately 30% of the variance in interests is attributable directly to genes, and another 20% to environmental effects acting in concert with genes, this primarily from the comparison of interests between the MZG twins reared together and apart (p. 275-276). Plomin et al. (1990) report almost identical estimates of direct and shared influence on children's television viewing preferences even after partialing out the contributions of general intelligence and temperament. (Television viewing preferences are probably a good indicator of a child's interests.)

In fact, learning (as typically construed as a "shaper" of infinitely modifiable, highly "plastic" interests, and particularly as the result of intentional instruction) may contribute only modestly to the development of lasting interests and personal orientations. The key term in previous sentence is "lasting." As obvious as it seems to even genetically-oriented researchers (e.g., Lykken et al., 1993), there exists no empirical evidence to suggest that sustainable interests may be "taught" or received through instruction. One could qualify this claim by saying that there exists no such evidence that sustainable interests may be taught where there exists no innate biological predisposition, but this author is unaware of any published research that has demonstrated an ability to teach sustainable interests to anyone. However, Osipow (1972; Osipow & Scheid, 1971) did attempt to increase respondents' willingness to engage in meaningless and trivial tasks, using as stimuli material such as nonsense syllables and "pictures of triads of obscure mechanical parts" (Osipow, p. 180). Indeed, he found that by experimentally manipulating the levels of positive reinforcement (randomly assigned regardless of actual performance) he could affect the degree to which individuals chose to engage in the more positively reinforced task. In interpreting his results, however, he acknowledged that "choice (action) is not exactly the same as preference since choices may be made with other issues in mind" (p. 180). He also noted that his experimental tasks were far removed from real life ones. Finally, Osipow did not retest his participants to see if the preferences were sustained over long periods of time. It is possible that the demand characteristics of his studies produced the results in a direction that appeared to suggest that respondents had learned to become interested in the reinforced task. Also, there remains some question as to whether Osipow (1972) and Locke (1965) were indeed measuring interests at all, given the nature of their tasks (typically nonsense in nature) and criteria (either behavioral or based on expressions of satisfaction, for Osipow and Locke, respectively).

It has long been assumed that individuals may "fake" (even if unwittingly) personality traits or interests (Piotrowski, 1946), and that issue will be addressed in the context of the subsequent discussion related to the role of temporary efforts at self-monitoring (Carson & Mowsesian, 1993b; Snyder, 1987) or self-deception (Carson & Mowsesian; Goleman, 1985) in work settings. However, in reference to whether or not one may inculcate through instruction sustainable vocational interests, there exists no unequivocal evidence.

Selection, Not Learning

Although some learning theorists -- and particularly Skinner (1987, pp. 51-63) -- conceptualize learning as a process in which the environment selects and reinforces behavior spontaneously generated by an organism, most of those who have discussed the "learning" of interests have used a simple copying model, as in a child copying the observed interests of the parent, or have suggested that children become interested only in what they are told they are good at doing. An intriguing alternative is that selection, and not learning (particularly in the latter copying sense), accounts for the development of interests. Gazzaniga (1992) reviews the comparative and developmental literature in support of selection theories of the development of a number of human cognitive and other domains, particularly language, and concludes that the evidence is overwhelming that selection, and not learning (as imitation), drives the development, not only of complex skills such as language, but also of a number of non-cognitive domains as well. Such selection processes fall into what geneticists have referred to as a broad category of complex environmental interactions, as opposed to straightforward genetic or environmental influences.

The present knowledge base regarding the linkages between the neurophysiological substrate and expressed interests is insufficient to identify which forms of neurobiological selection are involved in the selection of interests during development (or, for that matter, in most other areas as well; Gazzaniga, 1992, p. 51). One might speculate that many such forms of selection operate on observed changes in the development of interests in humans. However, for the time being (unless otherwise noted) this author will treat the particular neurobiological processes involved as a "black box" and await the availability of new data prior to extending the theory toward inclusion of the specific neurobiological mechanisms of selection of interests.

With that caveat in mind, six propositions constitute the proposed selection theory of origins of interests:

Primary Propositions: Genetic factors

1. A limited set of "potential" interests are inherited through genes.

2. Critical periods exist during which environmental factors may most readily select potential interests.

3. Almost all potential interests are associated with multiple combinations of genes, of which at least some important ones are located on the Y-chromosome.

Full discussion of primary assumptions

Secondary Propositions: Self and Environment

One might challenge the theory in that it would seemingly fail to account for the effects of subsequent life experiences, such as new jobs, on interests. Second, one might point to evidence which seems to suggest that interests are not always stable, even among adults, and that even individuals themselves can help to create their own interests. One might ask how stressful life events (e.g., a "brush with death") may seemingly provoke a permanent change in interests.

4. Interests arise, in part, through autopoiesis.

5. Interests also fall into two main groups: 1) selected interests, arising from selection of potential interests that have genetic correlates; and 2) "acted" interests, which are more effortful than selected ones, and which arise from self-presentational activity, with individuals high in self-monitoring being more adroit in generating and sustaining such acted interests.

6. Stressful life-events and other random processes can lead to changes in interests, although the resulting pattern of interests will still be constrained by underlying genetic potential.

Full discussion of secondary assumptions

Implications for Theory

Implications for Practice

Conclusion

A theory of the nature of interests has been proposed that should have applications in a number of applied areas, including educational and career interventions and career assessment. In particular, this theory of interests has implications for the assessment of interests. The theory cohabits with an emerging group of selection-oriented theories of cognition, personality, and psychopathology, thus making that set of theories more complete as models of human nature (Gazzaniga, 1992; Wachs & Plomin, 1991). It has been asserted that social learning (and related) theories of the development of interests -- while useful in accounting for self-presentational aspects of interests -- are insufficient in their emphasis. In particular, the role of social learning experiences in the development of interests has been downplayed (or at least reconceptualized), with a correspondingly increased emphasis on the contributions of genes interacting with critical periods in development. The focus of the theory fell on the nature and development of interests and personal orientations, to which selection theory appears to offer several directions for new theory development and research, as well as practical applications. Although material about sex has been incorporated into the discussion, the reader is cautioned to view this as a potentially valuable area for exploration, but one for which there is also potential for abuse. We need more data before we can begin applying the proposed theory to remedy historic problems related to equity-based concerns in this area.

Some tests of the theory are already within reach of mainstream vocational and counseling psychologists, such as attempts to examine factors impinging on the stability of children's aspirations and interests (see Trice, 1991) or efforts to teach clients to learn how to have sustainable interests (see Osipow, 1972). However, extensions and tests of the theory may well require forays into new areas, including genetics, neuropsychology, and childhood (and even prenatal) developmental psychology. For the foreseeable future, at least, researchers in these areas will probably have to collaborate with specialists in these various disciplines to test, elaborate, and extend this theory. Such collaboration should provide the sort of hard data which will allow important details to be painted into the present outline.

Links

Report. Interest assessment, by Jo-Ida C. Hansen. ERIC digest.

Resume, Jo-Ida C. Hansen, University of Minnesota.

Resume, Thomas Bouchard, University of Minnesota.

Doctoral study. Differential psychology/behavioral genetics, University of Minnesota.

Homepage, Linda S. Gottfredson, University of Delaware.

Behavior Genetics Association.

The Pioneer Fund. Sponsors research into individual differences, particularly relating to genetics.

Article. "Nature versus Nurture: The Invasion of the Mass Media," from American Psychological Association.

Research. Institute for Behavioral Genetics, University of Colorado.

References

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